Authrice MCP

Give ChatGPT, Claude, and other MCP clients a bounded, tenant-safe view of organization access without exposing credentials or authentication material.

Connect

Use the remote Streamable HTTP endpoint. The same endpoint works with MCP hosts that support OAuth 2.1 dynamic client registration and PKCE.

https://mcp.authrice.com/mcp

Authrice publishes RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata and RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. The connector requests only the authrice:read scope. Authorization codes use PKCE S256.

Read-only tools

list_usersBounded safe profiles for users with a role in your organization.
find_user_by_emailSafe profiles matching a full or partial email address in your organization.
get_user_accessA user profile plus that user’s roles in your organization.
list_rolesBounded user-to-role assignments for the current organization.
list_applicationsApplication identifiers and names, without client secrets.
list_pending_invitesPending access metadata without claim or reset secrets.
show_organization_access_overviewCounts and role distribution in a cross-host MCP App view.

Tenant and secret boundaries

Every API read is authenticated and forced to the organization bound into the OAuth token. Direct MongoDB access is not used. Cross-tenant identifiers return the same not-found response as missing records.

  • No password hashes or credential records.
  • No OAuth client secrets or signing keys.
  • No access, refresh, reset, invite, or session tokens.
  • No device metadata or user-agent history.
  • No data from another Authrice organization.

Revocation and access changes

OAuth clients can revoke tokens through Authrice’s standard revocation endpoint. Removing a user’s organization role also causes subsequent organization API reads to fail, even while an older token is still within its expiry window.